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Abstract
We study a mechanism design problem in which players can take
part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game.
By refusing to participate in the mechanism, a player can revert to
playing the default game non-cooperatively. We show with an example
that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms
which will be rejected on the equilibrium path. In our construction,
a refusal to participate conveys information about the types of the
players. This information causes the default game to be played under
diﬀerent beliefs, and more importantly under diﬀerent higher order
beliefs, than the interim ones. We ﬁnd a lower bound on all the
implementable payoﬀs. We use this bound to establish a condition
on the default game under which all the implementable outcomes are
truthfully implementable, without the need to induce rejection of the
mechanism.
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There are many mechanism design problems that involve agreements about
how to play some default game. Cartel agreements govern how ﬁrms compete
against one another; members of an auction bidding ring agree on how they
should bid against each other; trade agreements limit governments’ ability to
use trade barriers to increase their share of trade; organizations govern the
eﬀorts of workers who might otherwise compete against one another. Binding
agreements on how players should act in an otherwise strategic setting often
require unanimous consent of these players. One cannot coerce a ﬁrm into
a cartel or a sovereign state into an international treaty. Any potential
participant can veto the agreement and revert to playing the default game
non-cooperatively.
In this paper, we argue that when the outside option of the participants
is the non-cooperative play of a default game, the design problem is substan-
tially diﬀerent from the standard one where the outside option is a (possibly
type contingent) exogenous allocation. In particular, we show that there
are allocation rules that are implementable in this setting, only if the mech-
anism designer oﬀers mechanisms which will be rejected by some types of
some players. Since the participation decision is type dependent, a refusal
to participate conveys information that causes the default game to be played
diﬀerently than it would have been if players used only their interim beliefs.
Our results provide some insight into the fact that negotiations do not
always lead to successful agreements. Recent examples include the failed mer-
ger between Microsoft and Yahoo as well as Ford’s refusal to fully participate
in the US auto bailout program. Our approach illustrates that these failures
may in fact contribute to players’ objectives. In our framework, a mechanism
is as much a device designed to modify outcomes when negotiations fail as it
is a device that shapes an agreement.
In order to make this point, we develop an example based on a possible
cartel agreement between two oligopolists, one of which has a hidden pro-
duction cost.1 If these ﬁrms cannot agree on the cartel mechanism, they
will play the default Cournot game. Suppose that the designer oﬀers an
agreement which is acceptable by the low cost type of the informed ﬁrm but
1Cartel agreements by asymmetrically informed ﬁrms are already studied as examples
of the design setup with default game by Cramton and Palfrey (1990 and 1995). Similar
examples can be constructed with auction and public good provision games, as we have
done in earlier versions of this paper.
1not by its high cost type. In this case, this ﬁrm will be signaling its cost
level to its uninformed rival with its decision to participate in the cartel.
Accordingly, whenever the cartel agreement is rejected, these ﬁrms will play
the default Cournot game under the updated beliefs (and the updated higher
order beliefs) on the cost of the informed ﬁrm.
The induced modiﬁcation in the information structure changes the equi-
librium default game behavior of the ﬁrms involved. In particular, once the
low cost type of the informed ﬁrm is given the ability to signal its cost to the
rival ﬁrm, it will act more aggressively (choose a higher output level) in the
default Cournot game. Therefore the initially uninformed ﬁrm will expect
a lower Cournot proﬁt in comparison to its proﬁt under the interim beliefs.
In Section 2, we show that the designer can use this particular feature of
the Cournot game to implement an allocation rule which would have been
unacceptable to the uninformed ﬁrm if the default game was played under
the interim beliefs.
In a standard mechanism design setting, where the outside option is an
exogenous allocation, any potential participant has the opportunity to reject
the mechanism and get the reservation payoﬀ she would have received from
this exogenous allocation. It is incumbent upon the designer to ensure that
each participant receives a payoﬀ at least as large as this reservation payoﬀ.
In contrast, when the outside option is a default game, the example we
outlined above indicates a role for the designer in the determination of the
reservation payoﬀ as well.2
Participation decisions convey relevant information only when these de-
cisions are type dependent and therefore non-degenerate. This means that a
manipulation of the reservation payoﬀs requires an equilibrium rejection, i.e.,
rejection of the mechanism on the equilibrium path with positive probability.
Existence of allocation rules which are implementable only through equilib-
rium rejection presents a major diﬃculty for the characterization of all the
implementable allocation rules. Nevertheless we show that the default game
yields a lower bound on the implementable payoﬀs. With the help of this
lower bound we ﬁnd a condition on the default game under which all imple-
mentable allocation rules are truthfully implementable without the need to
2A government bailout plan is another example of a mechanism where those who choose
not to participate are still aﬀected by its parameters. Philippon and Skreta (2010) study
optimal bailout mechanisms to jump-start failing markets. They show that a ﬁrm’s refusal
of the bailout signals its conﬁdence in the performance of its assets without a direct help
from the government. See also Tirole (forthcoming).
2induce an equilibrium rejection. In Section 2, we give the intuition for these
two observations by using our Cournot example. In Section 3, we develop
them into general results in the framework of a model with an arbitrary
default game.
When the outside option is a default game, a cartel mechanism generates
a sequential game of incomplete information between the ﬁrms involved. A
sensible treatment of this game demands a sequential rationality restriction,
which requires the ﬁrms’ actions in the default game to be consistent with
the beliefs they hold at the time they act. This justiﬁes our choice of Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. In contrast, using the Bayesian
equilibrium (which is not perfect) would have eliminated the relevance of the
belief updates by the ﬁrms. This is best illustrated by Myerson’s model
of games with contracts (1991, Chapter 6). In this model, a mechanism
can still instruct the complying players how they should play the default
game when there exists some other player(s) rejecting it. Since Myerson
uses Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept, there is no sequential
rationality restriction on the post-rejection instructions of the mechanisms.
If our default Cournot game is played with such Myerson mechanisms, in
the event that one ﬁrm rejects the mechanism and the other one accepts, the
mechanism may instruct the complying ﬁrm to ﬂood the market by setting a
high enough production level. Such an instruction rules out the possibility of
making a proﬁt by rejecting the mechanism and ﬁxes the outside option for
each ﬁrm as zero proﬁt.3 Hence, the problem reduces to a standard design
problem, eliminating the need for an equilibrium rejection.4,5
3What is relevant here is not the magnitude of the rejection proﬁt, but the fact that
it is independent of the allocation rule implemented by the mechanism. Under complete
information, Myerson shows that any implementable allocation rule is implementable with
unanimous acceptance of a mechanism, which punishes a rejecting player by minimaxing
his payoﬀ in the default game.
4Auctions with externalities, as studied by Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996
and 1999) constitute another example of such mechanisms. In this setting, a bidder who
does not acquire the auctioned object may incur a negative externality if a competitor
receives the object. Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti show that the seller may extract
surplus even from the bidders who do not acquire the object. The seller achieves this by
threatening the bidders to give the object to their strongest competitor if they do not
participate.
5Another way of modeling mechanisms which are not completely void after rejection
is proposed by Dequiedt (2006). According to his model, once a mechanism is rejected,
players choose sequentially rational actions in the default game. However, a rejected
mechanism can still send messages to players, providing relevant information on the types
3When the outside option is an exogenously speciﬁed allocation rule, de-
manding sequential rationality oﬀ the equilibrium path does not restrain the
mechanism designer. Moreover, as Myerson demonstrates, once we give up
sequential rationality, a default game boils down to an allocation rule. If one
is willing to use Bayesian equilibrium instead of Perfect Bayesian, there is no
conceptual diﬀerence between default games and type contingent allocations
as outside options. On the other hand, if the objective is to understand the
restrictions that the default game imposes, then the relevant solution concept
must be Perfect Bayesian equilibrium or some other reﬁnement of Bayesian
equilibrium based on sequential rationality.
2 The Example
2.1 The Cournot Game with Private Cost
We build our example on an industry with two ﬁrms which are (potential)
producers of an homogenous good. Both ﬁrms have linear cost functions.
Firm 1 has the unit cost 0.7. The unit cost of ﬁrm 2 is either high (h =1)
or low (l =0.65). The realization of its own unit cost is private information
for ﬁrm 2.6 The inverse demand function for the good is given as P =
1 − (q1 + q2), where P is the price and q1, q2 are the production levels for
ﬁrms 1 and 2 respectively. These ﬁrms make their production decisions
simultaneously to maximize their expected proﬁt levels.
We let β2 denote the probability that ﬁrm 1 assigns to the event that
ﬁrm 2 has the low cost. This belief of ﬁrm 1 is common knowledge between
the ﬁrms. In the Appendix (Section 5.1), we show that the resulting game
of incomplete information has a unique Bayesian equilibrium (BE), where
ﬁrm 1 sets q1 =
0.6−0.35β2
4−β2 , the low cost type of ﬁrm 2 sets q2 (l) = 0.4
4−β2, and
the high cost type of ﬁrm 2 sets q2 (h) = 0. The expected proﬁt level of
each ﬁrm is the square of its equilibrium output level. Notice that, on the






is a decreasing function of the belief on ﬁrm 2’s type, and the proﬁt of the
of the complying players.
6Firm 1 can be thought as an incumbent, whose cost structure is already revealed by
its earlier conduct in the industry. Firm 2 may be a potential entrant, whose production
technology is private information.





, is increasing in the same parameter.
In other words, ﬁrm 1 loses out as it becomes more likely that its rival has
the low cost, whereas ﬁrm 2 (with low cost) beneﬁts from being perceived as
the low cost.
We construct our example under the assumption that ﬁrm 1’s belief on
ﬁrm 2’s type is uniform at the start of their interaction, i.e., β2 = 0.5 at
the interim stage. However, what is central to our study is understanding
how these ﬁrms change their behavior when there is a change in their be-
liefs. Therefore, the proﬁt functions π1 ( ) and π2 (l, ), which are derived as
functions of arbitrary beliefs, will prove to be useful throughout our analysis.
2.2 The Cartel Agreement
Suppose these two ﬁrms are able to sign a cartel agreement prior to making
their production decisions. Following Cramton and Palfrey (1990), we model
the cartel as a mechanism that is oﬀered by a third party, which we will call
the designer. The designer does not know the type of ﬁrm 2, and does not
posses any private information herself. Our aim in this paper is to discuss
what this designer is capable of doing, rather than what she would choose to
do. Therefore we will not be very speciﬁc on the designer’s objective for now.
She may be maximizing a weighted average of the ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts or
any other function of the ﬁrms’ production and proﬁt levels.
The mechanism induces a message game, where the messages from the
two ﬁrms are mapped into output levels for the ﬁrms and monetary side
transfers between them.7 Firms maximize their expected proﬁt level net of
the side transfer. When oﬀered a mechanism, each ﬁrm has an inalienable
right to reject it and play the Cournot game non-cooperatively. Following
the literature, we assume that the ﬁrms make their ratiﬁcation decisions
simultaneously. If both ﬁrms accept the mechanism, then they send their
messages to the mechanism, which in turn determines the output and side
transfer levels. If either one of the ﬁrms rejects the mechanism, then they
7As is common in the literature on mechanism design, we assume that the rules of the
mechanism are enforceable once the mechanism is accepted by the participants. An explicit
cartel agreement which allows the ﬁrms to coordinate their output levels and to make side
transfers to each other could be outlawed by antitrust laws. Yet, tacit agreements with side
transfers disguised as unrelated legitimate payments are harder to rule out. Cramton and
Palfrey (1990) provide several real life examples to cartel mechanisms which are overlooked
or sometimes even encouraged by the governments.
5learn which ﬁrm(s) rejected it and play the Cournot game by choosing their
production levels simultaneously. The design problem in this setup is non-
standard since the rejection payoﬀs are not exogenously speciﬁed but are
determined by the subsequent actions of the ﬁrms.
2.3 The Equilibrium
After the announcement of a mechanism, the interaction between the ﬁrms
can be considered as a sequential game of imperfect information. The solu-
tion concept we consider here is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This
solution concept is deﬁned as a collection of sequentially rational strategies
(which govern the ratiﬁcation decisions of the ﬁrms, their message choices if
the mechanism takes eﬀect, and their production decisions if the mechanism
is rejected) and consistent beliefs (on the type of ﬁrm 2 after observing this
ﬁrm’s ratiﬁcation decision).8 We provide the formal deﬁnitions of strategies,
beliefs, and PBE in Section 3 within the framework of a more general model
allowing for an arbitrary default game.
An allocation rule in this environment is deﬁned as a mapping from the
set of the ﬁrms’ type proﬁles (in the context of our example, this is a binary
set) to randomizations over the production and side transfer levels of the
ﬁrms. A mechanism implements an allocation rule if there exists a PBE
after the announcement of the mechanism, which supports the allocation
rule in question. An allocation rule is called implementable if there exists a
mechanism implementing it.9
In a direct revelation mechanism, the message set for each ﬁrm is identical
to its type space (implying a singleton message set for ﬁrm 1 and a binary
one for ﬁrm 2 in our example). Suppose there exists a PBE after the an-
nouncement of a direct revelation mechanism such that all types of all ﬁrms
accept the mechanism and reveal their types truthfully with their messages.
In this case, the resulting allocation rule is called truthfully implementable.
8In what follows, we make our main points by studying equilibria where both ratiﬁcation
decisions are on the equilibrium path. Therefore utilizing an alternative solution concept
which extends the consistency requirement for oﬀ the equilibrium path beliefs (such as
Sequential equilibrium) would not enrich the discussion.
9The implementation concept we use is “weak” implementation. That is, a mechanism
implements an allocation rule if the game induced by the mechanism has an equilibrium
supporting the allocation rule (as opposed to all of its equilibria supporting the allocation
rule).
62.4 Oﬀ the Equilibrium Path Beliefs
Whether a ﬁrm will accept a cartel mechanism depends on the continuation
payoﬀ it expects from accepting or rejecting it. Our discussion will be mainly
based on the rejection payoﬀ to be received from the default Cournot game.
If this game is played under the interim belief β2 = 0.5, ﬁrm 1 and the low




 2 ≈ 1.




 2 ≈ 1.3061 × 10−2 respectively. However,
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium allows for updating this belief after observing
the ratiﬁcation decision of ﬁrm 2. For instance, if a rejection is fully attrib-
uted to its high cost type, then the low cost type of ﬁrm 2 would receive
only π2 (l,0) = 1 × 10−2 from the default Cournot game. This observation
suggests that the designer may truthfully implement an allocation rule which
leaves a payoﬀ of 1×10−2 to this ﬁrm: If both types of ﬁrm 2 are expected to
accept a direct revelation mechanism, it is possible to assign the degenerate
belief of β2 = 0 in case of an oﬀ the equilibrium path rejection by ﬁrm 2.
Manipulation of the belief on the type of a party who unexpectedly re-
jects a mechanism is well studied in the design literature. Standard solution
concepts, including the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, do not put much re-
striction on such oﬀ the equilibrium path beliefs. The earlier literature is
mostly concerned with how to reﬁne such beliefs to ﬁnd more plausible ways
to outline what is feasible in a design setup.10 In contrast to this literature,
we do not employ any such reﬁnement here. Instead, we take almost the
opposite route and examine a larger class of equilibria, where rejection of the
mechanism may be on the equilibrium path.11
10This idea underlines the concepts of durability (Myerson and Holmstrom, 1983), at-
tainability (Crawford, 1985), resilience (Lagunoﬀ, 1995), and ratiﬁability (Cramton and
Palfrey, 1995). Imposing ratiﬁability of a mechanism may rule out joint proﬁt maxim-
ization of asymmetrically informed Cournot duopolists (Cramton and Palfrey, 1995) and
eﬃcient collusion of bidders in a second price auction with participation costs (Tan and
Yilankaya, 2007). A related notion is collusion proofness (Laﬀont and Martimort, 1997,
2000, and more recently Che and Kim, 2006), which requires the mechanisms to have the
property that one cannot ﬁnd a collusive agreement to improve over the non-cooperative
reporting to the mechanism.
11Motta (2010) also studies rejection on the equilibrium path (or more generally, type
dependence of participation decisions) in an environment where agents can collude after
accepting a mechanism. If the agents are not able to collude on their participation de-
cisions as well, Motta shows that the designer can completely eliminate the costs due to
collusion. This can be done by oﬀering the agents a selective supervision scheme, where
their participation decisions would reveal their private information.
72.5 Equilibrium Path Rejection
The discussion above points out that ﬁrm 2 (with low cost) may accept a
mechanism under the threat of a belief update, since its proﬁt in the default
Cournot game depends on its rival’s belief β2. We know from the construction
of function π1 (β2) that the same parameter also determines ﬁrm 1’s expected
default Cournot proﬁt. However, rejection of a mechanism by ﬁrm 1 cannot
lead to an update of β2, which is ﬁrm 1’s own belief on the type of ﬁrm 2.
In fact, in any PBE, where both types of ﬁrm 2 accept the mechanism with
probability one, ﬁrm 1 receives at least its expected Cournot proﬁt under its
interim belief: π1 (0.5) ≈ 1.4745 × 10−2.
We nowconsider another class of PBE, where ﬁrm2’s ratiﬁcation behavior
reveals its type. Suppose the mechanism is accepted by the low cost type of
ﬁrm 2 but rejected by its high cost type. Recall that ﬁrm 1 observes ﬁrm
2’s ratiﬁcation decision. Therefore consistency requirement of PBE implies
that ﬁrm 1 infers ﬁrm 2’s type after the ratiﬁcation stage. When playing the
Cournot game under complete information, ﬁrm 1 receives either π1 (0) =
(0.15)




 2 (if ﬁrm 2 has low cost).
The expected proﬁt level of ﬁrm 1 is the average of these two proﬁt levels
1
2π1 (0)+ 1
2π1 (1) ≈ 1.4722×10−2, which is smaller than its unique BE payoﬀ
from the Cournot game played under the interim belief.
The remaining task is constructing a mechanism which will indeed be
accepted by the low cost type of ﬁrm 2 and rejected by its high cost type.
Consider the following simple mechanism which does not respond to the
messages by the two ﬁrms (the message set for either ﬁrm is singleton):
Whenever it is accepted, the mechanism instructs the ﬁrms to set production




 2 to ﬁrm 1 as a side payment.
This corresponds to an allocation where ﬁrm 2 produces its monopoly output
for its low cost type and compensates ﬁrm 1 for its foregone Cournot proﬁt.
Once this mechanism is announced, there exists a PBE of the continuation
game, where ﬁrm 1 and the low cost type of ﬁrm 2 accept the mechanism,
but the high cost type of ﬁrm 2 rejects it. In case of a rejection by ﬁrm
2, ﬁrm 1 learns that its rival has the high unit cost and therefore chooses
its own monopoly output level of q1 = 0.15. If both ﬁrms accept, then
the mechanism dictates the output and side payment levels as above (The
complete formal construction of the equilibrium is in the Appendix, Section
5.2). This equilibrium supports an allocation rule which leaves ﬁrm 1 with
the expected proﬁt ≈ 1.4722 × 10−2.
8Construction of this equilibrium is based on the fact that ﬁrm 1’s expec-
ted proﬁt in the default Cournot game is lower whenever ﬁrm 1 infers its
competitor’s type.12 Firm 1’s proﬁt π1 (β2) is decreasing in β2. However it is
not convex. The information revealed by ﬁrm 2 allows the designer to reduce
ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ to a convex combination of the values of π1 (β2) under the two
degenerate beliefs13 (See Figure 1. For ease of demonstration, ﬁgures are not
drawn to scale).
Firm 1’s expected Cournot proﬁt as a function of beliefs
Reducing ﬁrm 1’s default Cournot proﬁt by revealing more information
about ﬁrm 2 may sound paradoxical. Resolution of this puzzle comes from
noticing that parameter β2 captures not only the ﬁrst order belief of ﬁrm
1, but also the higher order beliefs of both ﬁrms. By providing ﬁrm 1 with
information on the type of ﬁrm 2, we are also providing ﬁrm 2 with the know-
ledge that its rival has better information now. This aﬀects the continuation
12Kim (2008) makes a similar observation in the context of common value ﬁrst price
auctions: If the value of the auctioned object is submodular in the bidders’ signals, then
a bidder prefers to be uninformed of her rival’s signal.
13It is important to notice that, in the equilibrium we construct, ﬁrm 1 accepts the mech-
anism before observing ﬁrm 2’s type dependent participation decision, when the former
ﬁrm still maintains the interim belief β2 = 0.5. However at the time of its acceptance,
ﬁrm 1 is aware that ﬁrm 2’s decision will reveal the latter ﬁrm’s type and the default
game would be played under one of the degenerate beliefs. For this reason, the relevant
reservation payoﬀ of ﬁrm 1 is 1
2π1 (0) + 1
2π1 (1).
9behavior of both ﬁrms in the Cournot game. In particular, when its type is
known to ﬁrm 1, the low cost type of ﬁrm 2 chooses a higher output level
(in comparison to its optimal output choice under the interim belief). This
sequentially rational response of ﬁrm 2 to the belief update is the driving
force for the reduction in ﬁrm 1’s expected Cournot proﬁt.
At ﬁrst glance, it seems as if the allocation rule generated by this equi-
librium can be truthfully implemented with the following direct revelation
mechanism: Whenever ﬁrm 2 reports low cost to the mechanism, the output





 2 to ﬁrm 1). Whenever ﬁrm 2 reports high cost, the mechanism
instructs the ﬁrms to mimic their non-cooperative play of the Cournot game
under the belief that ﬁrm 2 has high cost (q1 = 0.15, q2 = 0 with no side
transfer). The problem with this direct revelation mechanism is that if both
types of ﬁrm 2 accept this mechanism for sure, then ﬁrm 1 would have the
option of rejecting it and playing the Cournot game under the interim belief.
This deviation provides ﬁrm 1 with the expected proﬁt of π1 (0.5), which is
larger than 1.4722 × 10−2. This observation also implies that any truthfully
implementable allocation rule must leave ﬁrm 1 with a payoﬀ at least as large
as π1 (0.5).
Our example establishes the existence of an implementable allocation
rule which is not truthfully implementable. A question of interest here is
whether a designer with plausible preferences would ﬁnd such an allocation
rule preferable to the truthfully implementable ones. To see the answer to
this question, ﬁrst notice that the industry proﬁts are maximized with the
PBE we construct above: In both states of nature, the ﬁrm with the lower
cost produces its monopoly output level, and the ﬁrm with the higher cost
shuts down. Moreover, ﬁrm 1’s expected share of these maximized industry
proﬁts is lower than any payoﬀ sustainable for this ﬁrm with truthful im-
plementation. Accordingly, this allocation rule dominates all the truthfully
implementable ones for a designer whose objective function is the weighted
average of the ﬁrms’ (ex-ante) payoﬀs, with the higher weight assigned to
ﬁrm 2’s share.
2.6 A Lower Bound on the Implementable Payoﬀs
The example we developed above indicates that a ﬁrm may be forced to
accept a mechanism with a lower payoﬀ, under the threat that credible in-
formation on its rival will be revealed. Since this information is revealed
10through the non-degenerate ratiﬁcation behavior of the rival, the same pay-
oﬀ cannot be truthfully implemented with a direct revelation mechanism
unanimously accepted by all the involved parties. Truthfully implementable
allocation rules are easily identiﬁed with two sets of constraints, ensuring the
participation of all players and truthful revelation of their private informa-
tion. However, existence of implementable but not truthfully implementable
allocation rules complicates the characterization of what is implementable.
In this part of the paper, we ﬁrst ﬁnd a lower bound on ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ for all
the implementable allocation rules, including the ones feasible only through
equilibrium rejection. Then we use this lower bound to derive a suﬃcient
condition (over the parametrization of our Cournot example) under which
all the implementable allocation rules are also truthfully implementable.
We start with showing that the designer can reduce ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ even
further by inducing ﬁrm 2 to reveal only partial information on its type.
To see this, consider a mechanism which makes the high type of ﬁrm 2
indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting. Suppose the low cost type of
ﬁrm 2 accepts this mechanism with probability one, but the high cost type
accepts it with probability 1/4 only. Now consider the updated beliefs of ﬁrm
1 after observing its rival’s ratiﬁcation decision. If ﬁrm 1 observes a rejection
(which happens with probability (1/2) × (3/4) = 3/8), it believes that its
rival has the high cost for sure (β2 = 0). Otherwise, when ﬁrm 1 observes an
acceptance (with probability 5/8), the Bayes formula reveals the conditional
probability of facing a low cost rival as
β2 =
1/2
(1/2) + (1/2) × (1/4)
= 0.8.
By rejecting the mechanism, ﬁrm 1 guarantees to play the default Cournot
game under either one of these two posterior beliefs. This provides ﬁrm 1
with an expected Cournot proﬁt of 3
8π1 (0)+ 5
8π1 (0.8) ≈ 1.4688×10−2, which
is lower than the expected proﬁt when the rival’s type is fully revealed.
The ratiﬁcation probabilities above are not chosen at random. As depic-
ted in Figures 2 and 3, ﬁrm 1’s expected Cournot proﬁt here is the value
corresponding to the interim belief β2 = 0.5 on the biconjugate function
which borders co(π1) from below, where co(π1) is the convex hull of the
graph of the function π1 ( ). The biconjugate function is formally deﬁned as
˘ π1 (β2) = min{x : (β2,x) ∈ co(π1)}.
11Notice that ˘ π1 ( ) is the largest convex function that is weakly smaller than
π1 ( ) for every value of β2.
Convex hull of the proﬁt function
Derivation of the biconjugate function
Whatever mechanism is oﬀered by the designer, ﬁrm 1 always has the
option of rejecting it and triggering the default Cournot game. By doing so,
12ﬁrm 1 receives a Cournot proﬁt on function π1 ( ). The exact level of the
proﬁt will be determined by what ﬁrm 1 learns from the rival’s ratiﬁcation
behavior. After observing this behavior, ﬁrm 1’s belief will be updated to
either one of the two posterior beliefs. The values of the posterior beliefs
depend on the nature of the (randomized) ratiﬁcation decisions of the types
of ﬁrm 2. However the Bayes rule requires that the expected posterior equals
the interim belief β2 = 0.5. At the ratiﬁcation stage, what is relevant for ﬁrm
1 is the expected value of the two proﬁt levels corresponding to these two
posteriors. Depending on ﬁrm 2’s ratiﬁcation strategy, this expected proﬁt
can be anywhere on the line segment [AB] drawn in Figure 2. Since the
expected Cournot proﬁt is at least as large as ˘ π1 (0.5) ≈ 1.4688 × 10−2, this
value constitutes a lower bound on the implementable payoﬀs for ﬁrm 1.
The way that we make use of the biconjugate of function π1 ( ) closely
resembles Kamenica and Gentzkow’s (forthcoming) utilization of the con-
cave closure of a sender’s payoﬀ as a function of a receiver’s posterior in a
persuasion game environment. In their formulation, the sender chooses the
posteriors of the receiver on condition that the expectation over the pos-
teriors equals the prior. In this setting, the maximized value of the sender’s
expected payoﬀ is on the concave closure of her payoﬀ function, which borders
the convex hull of the payoﬀ function’s graph from above.14 In contrast to
Kamenica and Gentzkow’s sender - receiver setting, we study a mechanism
design environment and try to outline the implementable allocation rules.
This problem induces the minimization of the outside option for the parti-
cipants of the mechanism. That is why we are interested in the biconjugate
function, which borders the convex hull of the graph of π1 ( ) from below.
The relation between function π1 and its biconjugate will also produce a
suﬃcient condition to rule out the need for an equilibrium rejection as part of
an implementation. We have already seen that any truthfully implementable
allocation rule would provide ﬁrm 1 with a payoﬀ at least as large as π1 (0.5),
its Cournot proﬁt level corresponding to the interim belief. If this proﬁt
level was already on the biconjugate of function π1, that is if functions π1
and ˘ π1 gave the same value for the interim belief, then revealing further
information about the rival ﬁrm would not have reduced ﬁrm 1’s Cournot
proﬁt. For instance, if the interim belief of ﬁrm 1 was weakly larger than 0.8
14Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Goemans and Fay (2009) refer to a similar concave
closure to study maximization problems where the choice variable is the distribution under
the constraint that its expectation equals a constant.
13(instead of being equal to 0.5) in our Cournot example, then we would not be
able to enlarge the implementable set beyond the truthfully implementable
allocation rules.
3 The Model
In this section, we study a general mechanism design setting, with an arbit-
rary number of agents and an arbitrary default game as the outside option.
To be consistent with the language of the previous section, we continue re-
ferring to the agents of our model as ﬁrms. N = {1,2,...,|N|} is the ﬁnite
set which accepts these ﬁrms as its elements. For each ﬁrm i ∈ N, we let Θi
denote the set of ﬁnitely many types available for this ﬁrm.
At the start of the interaction, ﬁrm i observes its own type θi ∈ Θi, which
is a random variable for the other ﬁrms. We assume that types of diﬀerent
ﬁrms are statistically independent. The initial beliefs of the other ﬁrms on
the type of ﬁrm i are represented by the interim distribution β
0
i ∈ ∆Θi. The
value of β
0
i (θi) gives the probability that ﬁrms other than ﬁrm i attribute
to the event that ﬁrm i has type θi at the time that the interaction between
the ﬁrms starts.
3.1 The Default Game under Arbitrary Beliefs
In the default game, each ﬁrm i can choose an output level from the set
of available output levels Qi (or more generally an action from the set of
available actions). Firm i’s direct proﬁt in the default game is a function of
the proﬁle of the chosen output levels and its type:
ui : ×i∈NQi × Θi → R,
where R is the set of real numbers.
The set of ﬁrms, the type spaces, the available output levels, and the
proﬁt functions deﬁne a Bayesian game together with the interim beliefs
speciﬁed earlier. However, since we will allow for the default game to be
played under updated beliefs, we study this game under an arbitrary belief
system β = {βi}i∈N rather than the interim beliefs. As in the deﬁnition of
the interim beliefs, βi is an element of ∆Θi and βi (θi) yields the probability
that the other ﬁrms are attributing to the event that ﬁrm i has type θi when
they are playing the default game.
14N,{Θi}i∈N ,{Qi}i∈N ,{ui}i∈N, and β constitute a Bayesian Default Game.
The choice variable for ﬁrm i is its (possibly randomized) output level, which
can be conditioned on the realization of its type:
qi : Θi → ∆Qi.
In equilibrium, each type of each ﬁrm chooses its output level to maximize its
expected direct proﬁt in the default game. The beliefs enter into the picture
in the calculation of these expected proﬁts. Under the arbitrary belief system
β, a Bayesian equilibrium of the default game is deﬁned as a collection of
output functions {qi}i∈N such that output level (or any output level in the





ui (ˆ qi,q−i (θ−i),θi)|β−i
 
for all i ∈ N and all θi ∈ Θi.15
We restrict attention to default games which have at least one Bayesian
equilibrium for all possible beliefs (Existence is assured whenever all Qi’s are
ﬁnite sets). For equilibrium {qi}i∈N under belief system β, expected proﬁt for




. Due to the possibility of mul-
tiple equilibria, there may be more than one expected proﬁt level consistent
with some belief system. We deﬁne πi as the correspondence that maps the





is the set of the expected equilibrium proﬁt levels for type





As was the case with the Cournot example of the previous section, the
largest function which is convex in β−i and which takes values weakly smal-





an important part in our analysis of the general model. With a minor ab-
use of terminology, we refer to this function as the biconjugate function for











∈ co(πi (θi,βi, ))
 
,
where co(πi (θi,βi, )) refers to the convex hull of the graph of correspondence
πi(θi,βi, ) for ﬁxed values of θi and βi.
15As is standard, subscript −i refers to the collection of one variable for each ﬁrm other
than ﬁrm i.
153.2 The Message Game under Arbitrary Beliefs
The cartel mechanism, if accepted, instructs the ﬁrms what output levels
they should choose in the default game. Moreover, the mechanism allows for
transferable payoﬀs between the ﬁrms by stipulating monetary side trans-
fers. The mechanism can condition these choices on revelations by (the
messages of) the ﬁrms. Formally a mechanism is comprised of a message
set Mi for each ﬁrm i, an output function determining the ﬁrms’ (possibly
randomized) production levels χ : ×i∈NMi → ∆×i∈N Qi, and a side transfer
function τ : ×i∈NMi → ∆R|N| subject to the constraint that the transfers
the ﬁrms receive from each other add up to 0 under all states.16
We can construct the payoﬀ (net of the side transfer) of a ﬁrm taking part
in this mechanism by using the proﬁt functions in the default game. Suppose
that the ﬁrms send the message proﬁle m ∈ ×i∈NMi to the mechanism. In
this case, ﬁrm i with type θi will end up with payoﬀ
wi (m,θi) = ui (χ(m),θi) + τi (m),
where τi (m) is the transfer ﬁrm i receives (the ith component of vector τ (m)).
Once these payoﬀ functions are deﬁned, an accepted mechanism induces a
message game between the ﬁrms. The choice variable for each ﬁrm is its
(possibly randomized) message, which can be conditioned on the realization
of its type:
mi : Θi → ∆Mi.
Each type of each ﬁrm chooses a message to maximize its expected payoﬀ. As
in our discussion of the default game, the expected payoﬀ is well deﬁned only
under some belief system β. Under the arbitrary belief system β, a Bayesian
equilibrium of the message game is a collection of message functions {mi}i∈N
such that message (or any message in the support of randomization) mi(θi)







for all i ∈ N and all θi ∈ Θi.
16The model can be easily extended to allow for correlation between the randomizations
over production and side transfer levels.
163.3 Ratiﬁcation
After the ﬁrms observe the default game and the mechanism, they simultan-
eously decide whether to accept the mechanism or not. We represent ﬁrm i’s
ratiﬁcation decision with the binary variable ri (equals to y if ﬁrm i accepts,
to n otherwise). Firm i can condition the probability of acceptance on its
private information:
σi : Θi → [0,1].
We refer to r = {ri}i∈N as a ratiﬁcation proﬁle. Since there are a total
of |N| ﬁrms and each of them can choose one of the two decisions, there
are 2|N| diﬀerent possible ratiﬁcation proﬁles. After the ratiﬁcation stage,
ﬁrms observe each others’ ratiﬁcation decisions. In other words, the realized
vector r becomes public information. This observation gives the ﬁrms the
opportunity to update beliefs on each other. Whenever ﬁrm i accepts the
mechanism, the belief of the other ﬁrms on the type of ﬁrm i is represented
by β
y
i ∈ ∆Θi. Similarly, β
n
i ∈ ∆Θi gives the rival ﬁrms’ belief if ﬁrm i rejects
the mechanism.17
The mechanism comes into eﬀect in the event that it is accepted unanim-
ously by all ﬁrms (that is, when the ratiﬁcation proﬁle is a vector composed
of y’s). In this case, each ﬁrm sends its message to the mechanism. By using
these messages as inputs, functions χ and τ determine the output and side
transfer levels, and eventually the payoﬀs of the ﬁrms.
On the other hand, the mechanism is vetoed whenever there exists some
ﬁrm(s) rejecting it at the ratiﬁcation stage. Notice that there are 2|N| − 1
diﬀerent ratiﬁcation proﬁles under which the mechanism will be rejected by
at least one of the ﬁrms. We let V denote the set of these 2|N|−1 ratiﬁcation
proﬁles that lead to a veto of the mechanism. After learning the realized
ratiﬁcation proﬁle r, each ﬁrm decides on its default game output level. The
direct proﬁts of the ﬁrms from the default game are determined by these
output levels.
17With this notation, we impose the restriction that two diﬀerent ﬁrms, which have
observed the same oﬀ the equilibrium path decision by a rival ﬁrm, will hold the same
belief about this rival. This condition is automatically satisﬁed when the solution concept
is Sequential equilibrium. Making this restriction is also commonplace for Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
173.4 The Equilibrium
Given the default game, the interim beliefs, and the proposed mechanism, the
resulting interaction between the ﬁrms can be thought as a sequential game.
We now specify the Bayesian (behavior) strategies and beliefs constituting a
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game:












i∈N which together satisfy the conditions
listed below:
i) {m∗
i}i∈N constitutes a Bayesian Equilibrium of the message game in-
duced by the mechanism under the belief system {β
y∗
i }i∈N.
ii) For each ratiﬁcation proﬁle r ∈ V leading to a veto of the mechanism,
{qr∗




iii) For each ﬁrm i ∈ N and each type θi ∈ Θi, σ∗
i (θi) maximizes the
expected continuation payoﬀ, given the rival ﬁrms’ ratiﬁcation behavior σ∗
−i





i }i∈N and {β
n∗
i }i∈N are derived by the Bayes formula on the equi-










i(ˆ θi) if σ∗











i(ˆ θi)] if σ∗
i is not constant at 1.
Now that we are equipped with the formal statement of our solution
concept, we can use the deﬁnitions in Section 2 to refer to the implementable
and truthfully implementable allocation rules in this general setting.
3.5 The Analysis
By rejecting a mechanism, ﬁrm i guarantees that the continuation game will
be the default game instead of the message game stipulated by the mech-
anism. Nevertheless, at the time of its rejection, ﬁrm i does not necessarily
know the beliefs under which the default game will be played. The belief on
ﬁrm i’s type itself, β
n∗
i , is pinned down by the equilibrium. However, the
belief on the type of a rival ﬁrm, say ﬁrm j, will depend on whether ﬁrm j
accepts the mechanism (β
y∗
j ) or joins ﬁrm i in rejecting it (β
n∗
j ). The realiz-
ation of ﬁrm j’s ratiﬁcation decision is unknown to ﬁrm i at the ratiﬁcation





18both derived from the Bayes rule (whenever ﬁrm j’s ratiﬁcation decision is

































Recall that πi is deﬁned as the correspondence which gives the possible









gives the possible proﬁt levels for type θi of ﬁrm i








. As we have
seen in the previous section, when the default game may be played under a
variety of belief systems, ﬁrm i’s expected proﬁt can be strictly lower than
the values of πi under the interim beliefs. We use the biconjugate function
˘ πi to establish a lower bound on the equilibrium payoﬀ of ﬁrm i.












of the continuation game. Under this equilibrium, the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrm









The proof is relegated to the Appendix. This result yields a lower bound
on the equilibrium payoﬀ as a function of the rejection beliefs speciﬁed by
the equilibrium. In order to get a bound that refers only to the primitives of
the problem, it suﬃces to minimize ˘ πi over the beliefs on ﬁrm i.
Corollary 1 For any implementable allocation rule, the expected payoﬀ of







The Cournot default game we covered in Section 2 is an example of the
case where the biconjugate function ˘ πi lies strictly below the correspondence
πi for some beliefs. In the analysis of this example we have seen that this
situation brings the opportunity of reducing the payoﬀ of a ﬁrm below its
default game Bayesian equilibrium proﬁt under the interim beliefs. However
supporting any such payoﬀ requires the construction of an equilibrium where
some rival ﬁrm signals part of its private information with its ratiﬁcation of
the mechanism. For this signal to have an informative value, both accept-
ing and rejecting the mechanism must be equilibrium behavior for this rival
ﬁrm. Since truthful implementation demands for a unanimous acceptance
19of a direct revelation mechanism by all types of all ﬁrms, no such payoﬀ is
truthfully implementable.
On the other hand, if the values of function ˘ πi and correspondence πi
coincide for the interim belief β
0
−i for all types of all ﬁrms regardless of the
belief βi, then considering rejections on the equilibrium path does not extend
the set of implementable outcomes. In other words, this condition rules out
the implementable allocation rules which are not truthfully implementable.
We conclude our analysis with the formalization of this result, which we prove
in the Appendix.
Proposition 2 Suppose that for each ﬁrm i ∈ N, each type θi ∈ Θi, and






has a single value which






. Then any implementable allocation rule is also
truthfully implementable.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a mechanism design problem where players either
accept a mechanism or play a default game non-cooperatively. Default games
are more diﬃcult to handle than (possibly type contingent) exogenous al-
locations as outside options of mechanisms. The diﬃculty arises from the
existence of allocation rules which are implementable only if a mechanism is
rejected on the path of play. Although our modeling of this problem is in line
with most of the earlier literature, it is certainly not the unique way to ad-
dress a mechanism design setting. We conclude the paper with a discussion
of alternative modeling assumptions.18
Pre-play communication in the default game:
Rejection of a mechanism on the equilibrium path is crucial for imple-
mentation of certain allocation rules since a rejection has the potential to
reveal information on the type of the rejecting player. In this case the de-
fault game is played in light of this additional information. An alternative
way of providing players with the opportunity to signal their types is allowing
for pre-play communication in the default game.19 However exchanging cheap
18For the sake of brevity, we do not provide the technical details of the arguments we
make here. A formal analysis of each alternative assumption is available from the authors.
19Matthews and Postlewaite (1989), Palfrey and Srivastava (1991), and Forges (1999)
show that pre-play communication between players of a game dramatically extends the
set of equilibria.
20talk messages in a pre-play communication stage is not a perfect substitute
for equilibrium rejection of a mechanism. The latter form of communication
determines whether a mechanism will take eﬀect or not, and therefore carries
an inherent cost for the players, unlike sending cheap talk messages.
Unobservable ratiﬁcation decisions:
We assumed in our analysis that each player’s acceptance or rejection
of the mechanism is observed by all the others. An alternative approach is
assuming that the players only ﬁnd out whether a mechanism takes eﬀect or
not, instead of learning about every individual ratiﬁcation decision. Notice
that, under this alternative assumption, a player who accepts the mechanism
will still infer some information about its rivals by simply observing if the
mechanism is unanimously accepted. In this case, rejection of the mechanism
signals the existence of at least one player who has refused to participate,
giving the opportunity for a belief update. Therefore, even when the indi-
vidual ratiﬁcation decisions are unobserved, it is still possible to construct
allocation rules which are implementable only with mechanisms rejected on
the equilibrium path.
Mechanisms oﬀered by players:
Suppose the mechanism is oﬀered not by a designer, but by one of the
players who has private information. This assumption creates an informed
principal setting.20 The analysis we provide in this paper suggests that there
are allocation rules which are implementable only if this informed principal
signals her type with the choice of the mechanism. This is in contrast with
the inscrutability principle, which applies to settings with exogenous outside
options and which indicates that any available allocation rule can be sup-
ported with an equilibrium where the principal oﬀers the same mechanism
regardless of her type.
5 Appendix
5.1 BE of the Default Cournot Game
The Cournot game with private information, which we utilized to construct
our example in Section 2, can be analyzed within the framework developed
in Section 3. Any nonnegative output level is available to either ﬁrm, which
20As studied by Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992) for the case where
the outside option is an exogenous allocation rule.
21means that Qi = R+ for i = 1,2. The proﬁt levels of the ﬁrms are ui =
[1 − (qi + qj) − ci]qi, where ci indicates the unit cost. The unit cost of ﬁrm
1 equals to 0.7 and ﬁrm 2’s cost level is either l = 0.65 or h = 1. Since the
type space of ﬁrm 2 is binary, the belief on its type (β2) can be represented
by the probability of this ﬁrm assuming the low cost type l. The interim
belief on ﬁrm 2’s type is given as β
0
2 = 0.5.
When applying the deﬁnition of the Bayesian equilibrium to the Cournot
game, the ﬁrst point to note is the dominant strategy of ﬁrm 2 with the high
cost level. Whenever ﬁrm 2 has unit cost 1, its proﬁt function is given as
−(q1 + q2(h))q2(h), which is maximized with the output choice q2(h) = 0.
Therefore the equilibrium output level of the high cost type of ﬁrm 2 is
determined as zero regardless of the beliefs. Zero output brings zero proﬁt
to this ﬁrm.
Now we move to the output levels of ﬁrm 1 as well as the low cost type
of ﬁrm 2. Since the latter ﬁrm has unit cost 0.65, its proﬁt level is given by
the function (1 − q1 − q2(l) − 0.65)q2(l), which is maximized with the output
choice q2(l) =
0.35−q1
2 for the relevant values of q1. To derive a similar reaction
function for ﬁrm 1, notice that the expected output level by ﬁrm 2 is β2q2(l).
Since ﬁrm 1 has cost 0.7, its reaction function is written as q1 =
0.3−β2q2(l)
2
for the relevant values of q2(l). When we solve for the two reaction functions









After substituting these values in the (expected) proﬁt functions, we see that
the maximized levels of the proﬁts are (q1)
2 and (q2(l))
2 for these two ﬁrms.
5.2 The Mechanism and PBE of the Induced Game
The mechanism constructed in Section 2 does not make use of the mes-
sages sent after acceptance. Accordingly, message sets M1 and M2 are both
singleton. The output levels following a unanimous acceptance of the mech-
anism are χ1 = 0 and χ2 = 0.175. When the mechanism takes eﬀect, ﬁrm 2




 2 to ﬁrm 1. In the sequential game
following the announcement of this mechanism, there exists a PBE depicted
as below following the notation developed in Section 3:
• σ∗
1 = σ∗
2 (l) = 1 and σ∗
2 (h) = 0,
22• if r1 = n and r2 = y, then β
r∗
2 = 1, qr∗
1 = 1
12, qr∗
2 (l) = 2
15, and
qr∗
2 (h) = 0,
• if r2 = n, then β
r∗
2 = 0, qr∗
1 = 0.15, qr∗
2 (l) = 0.1, and qr∗
2 (h) = 0
regardless of the value of r1.
To prove that this is indeed an equilibrium, we need to establish that the
strategies and the beliefs above satisfy the four conditions of PBE:
i) Since the induced message game is a degenerate game without any
message choices for the ﬁrms, this condition is trivially satisﬁed.
ii) For r2 = y, the belief β
r∗
2 = 1 implies that qr∗
1 and qr∗
2 (l) are equal to
the unique complete information Cournot competition output levels ( 1
12 and
2
15) when ﬁrms have cost levels 0.7 and 0.65. Moreover, qr∗
2 (h) = 0 is the
dominant output level for ﬁrm 2 with high cost.
For r2 = n, the belief β
r∗
2 = 0 dictates that ﬁrm 1 produces the monopoly
output level 0.15 . As a best response, ﬁrm 2 with low cost produces 0.1 and
ﬁrm 2 with high cost produces 0.





the monopoly proﬁt (0.15)
2. By accepting the mechanism, ﬁrm 1 guarantees
exactly the same payoﬀ. Since ﬁrm 1 is indiﬀerent, accepting the mechanism
with probability one is an optimal ratiﬁcation behavior.





 2 by accepting the mechanism
and (0.1)
2 by rejecting it. Since acceptance brings a larger payoﬀ, σ∗
2 (l) = 1
is optimal. Firm 2 with high cost receives a negative payoﬀ by accepting the
mechanism and 0 by rejecting it. Therefore the optimal ratiﬁcation decision
induces σ∗
2 (h) = 0 as well.
iv) The ratiﬁcation behavior separates the two types of ﬁrm 2. Bayes rule
dictates that β
r∗
2 = 1 if r2 = y and β
r∗
2 = 0 if r2 = n.
5.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose ﬁrm i rejects the mechanism at the ratiﬁcation stage. Following this
rejection, the belief on the type of ﬁrm i is updated to β
n∗
i . There are 2|N|−1
diﬀerent combinations of ratiﬁcation decisions of ﬁrm i’s rivals. Therefore,
following the rejection of ﬁrm i, the default game will be played under one of






on the types of ﬁrm i’s rivals.
It follows from the Bayes rule that the expected value of these 2|N|−1 diﬀerent
beliefs is equal to the interim belief β
0
−i at the ratiﬁcation stage.









gives the possible proﬁt levels for type θi of ﬁrm i when













−i at the ratiﬁcation stage, the expected payoﬀ of type θi of ﬁrm









θi chooses its ratiﬁcation decision to maximize the continuation payoﬀ. Ac-
cordingly, the equilibrium payoﬀ of this type is at least as large as the lower









5.4 Proof of Proposition 2
We start with an arbitrary implementable allocation rule. There exists a












of the continuation game supporting this rule. Suppose the same allocation
rule is now oﬀered as a direct revelation mechanism Md. To prove the



















i (θi) = 1, for all i and θi
 
, and reveal their types truthfully  
md
i (θi) = θi, for all i and θi
 
. By construction, each type of each ﬁrm re-
ceives the same payoﬀ under Ed as under E∗.
Equilibrium Ed instructs all parties to accept the direct revelation mech-
anism unanimously. It follows from the Bayes rule (satisfying condition (iv)
of the deﬁnition of PBE) that beliefs remain the same as their interim values





i for all i.
On the other hand, there is no consistency requirement for the oﬀ the equi-
librium path rejection beliefs in Ed. In our construction, we set these beliefs











r∈V specify the continuation behavior of ﬁrm i fol-
lowing an oﬀ the equilibrium path rejection. We set these functions to be







i∈N (satisfying condition (ii) of the deﬁnition of
PBE).
24To complete the proof, we need to show that truthful revelation of the
















above, after the announcement of direct revelation mechanism Md.
Truthful revelation: Suppose type θi of ﬁrm i imitates type ˆ θi in the






i∈N , this devi-
ation will bring type θi the same payoﬀ as mimicking the equilibrium strategy



















after the announcement of mechanism M∗. Since ratiﬁcation, message, and
output decisions are made optimally under E∗, imitating type ˆ θi does not
bring a strictly higher expected payoﬀ to type θi of ﬁrm i (satisfying condition
(i) of the deﬁnition of PBE).
Acceptance of the mechanism: By unilaterally rejecting this mechan-









hypothesis of the proposition implies that, when the default game is played
under these beliefs, there is a unique equilibrium proﬁt level for each type








. Recall that β
n∗
i is the rejection
belief under equilibrium E∗ following the announcement of mechanism M∗.
It follows from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium payoﬀ for type θi (under








(satisfying condition (iii) of the deﬁnition of PBE).
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